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Abstract
This report provides an overview of the datafication of borders and the management of
refugees within the context of the EU. It analyses different reports, papers and systems that are
part of the data processes confronted by refugees and asylum seekers. The report is focused on
existing systems used by the EU and the UNHCR, but also draws on further studies on the use
of Big Data in the context of refugees.
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1 Introduction: datafication of borders and management of refugees
Figure 1: The refugee journey.
The datafication of the governance of refugees occurs in
different ways and at different stages of the migration
trail. Sources can vary from human rights organizations
and international agencies, press coverage, social net-
works, mobile use states and border authorities among
others. At the same time, a common information source
through their entire lives can be mobile data, social net-
works and emails.
We can divide the datafication of migration manage-
ment in several stages that might not hold for all per-
sons:
• Reports from the original country or region that
conditions the qualification of a person applying
for asylum.
• The identification and tracking of refugees during
their life in temporal or permanent refugee camps.
• The journey of refugees through states, borders
and territories.
• Borders control and asylum evaluation at the host
country.
• Identification and tracking of refugee status.
2 Registration and identity management by the UNHCR
This section describes the UNHCR identify and registration systems as well as where they are
used. At the end of the section we identify the relevance of these systems in Europe and we
summarize ongoing projects and discussions of biometric identify systems.
2.1 Population Registration and Identity Management EcoSystem (PRIMES)
UNHCR advocates that all refugees and asylum seekers be registered individually as a means
to guarantee basic human rights to provide access to services but also to evaluate and track
events. The agency is developing the Population Registration and Identity Management Eco-
System (PRIMES) trust and service platform that will be the single entry point1 for all digital in-
teraction between UNHCR and partners with the individuals who are registered2. This includes
existing tools such as proGres v4 for case management, the UNHCR’s Biometric Identity Manage-
ment System (BIMS), and the newly developed Rapid Application (RApp) for mobile registration.
PRIMES will initially be deployed in East and Horn of Africa, Middle East and North Africa and
francophone Africa during 2018 and 20193. Features of PRIMES are:
• Registration (biographic and biometric) and certification
• Case-management (including the principal Protection aspects: Refugee Status Determination, Re-
settlement, Repatriation, Legal and Physical Protection, Child Protection, SGBV and others)
• Assistance (cash and in-kind)
1Previous version of proGres v3 consisted on 500 local databases instead of a centralised database.
2http://www.unhcr.org/uk/primes.html
3http://www.unhcr.org/blogs/countdown-accelerated-primes-roll-starting-may/
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Figure 2: The PRIMES ecosystem of tools (Source UNHCR https://www.unhcr.org/
primes.html).
• Data management, including reporting and sharing
The PRIME platform is a collection of interoperable tools and databases for the registration of
‘persons of concern’ (this includes external partners tools)4:
The Population Registration and Identity Management Eco-System (PRIMES) is a plat-
form for all UNHCR registration and identity management tools and applications, in-
cluding existing tools such as proGres, the Biometric Identity Management System
(BIMS), the Global Distribution Tool (GDT), the Rapid Application (RApp), IrisGuard
and RAIS, as well as those to be developed in the future. PRIMES applications are
designed to work in offline, online and GSM environments, and will be interoper-
able with IT systems used by governments and partner organisations such as WFP
(SCOPE) and Unicef (Primero). New PRIMES applications going forward will aim to
promote direct access by persons of concern (e.g. access to personal data, entitlement
accounts, identity wallet).
The proGres database software is already used in more than 70 countries and contains written
details and photos of refugees (including case documentation), but it can be extended to the use
of biometric data. According to the UN, the system covers 10% of refugee data. The registration
process can be done directly by the UNHCR or by the host states. To do so, the UNHCR is
4http://www.unhcr.org/registration-guidance/chapter2/registration-tools/
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Figure 3: Examples of refugee ID cards in Spain (top) and the UK (bottom).
building extensive guidance on registration and identify management56.
The host states are responsible of implementing refugees’ registration and tracking in coor-
dination with the UNHCR, otherwise the UNHCR performs direct data registration. However,
disparate design of solutions is possible such as refugee status documentation in different coun-
tries (see Figure 3 for the examples of Spain and the UK).
More information and news can be found on the UNHCR online portal on registration7 and
their blog on digital inclusion8. Also, the agency has an extensive handbook on registration9 (last
published version is 2003). The website Biometric Update has a permanent section for UNHCR
news on biometric identify management10.
5http://www.unhcr.org/registration-guidance/
6Note the UNHCR official web on registration presents numerous broken links of special relevant information such as
procedures of people registration during emergencies.
7http://www.unhcr.org/uk/registration.html
8http://www.unhcr.org/blogs/digital-inclusion/
9http://www.unhcr.org/uk/publications/operations/4a278ea1d/unhcr-handbook-
registration-provisional-release-september-2003-complete.html
10https://www.biometricupdate.com/tag/unhcr
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The following sections describe the tools ecosystem of the UNHCR that are used both in
refugee camps and host countries.
2.2 Datasets for registration
The UNHCR has developed five data sets which can be extended to match the needs of specific
cases11. The agency encourages consideration for the necessity of gathering additional data. The
table in Appendix A summarises datasets, variables and purposes of those datasets.
2.3 ProGres
Description
ProGres is ’the UNHCR’s corporate, centralized, web-based case management software application. Pro-
Gres v4 supports operational functions ranging from the registration of individuals to a wide range of
UNHCR case management functions including assistance, protection case management, protection in-
terventions and the provision of documentation and cash-based assistance.’. The system implements
role-based security access to implement sensitive information protection, not only for personal
data, but also for case management. Appendix B lists some examples of case management with
ProGres.
Interaction with other systems
ProGres can be integrated with BIMS (biometric database), the GDT (food and assistance distri-
bution), Data Port (reporting and data analysis) and financial service providers if cash assistance
is required. ProGres is used by the UNHCR Demographic Projection Tool (DPTool)12. The DP-
Tool provides predictions, in number and composition, of the evolution of the population of a
refugee community that is used to plan durable solutions for camps. It combines demographics
from ProGres with statistical techniques for population projection that considers several statistical
variables, linked to a context, such as age and sex distribution, death rates, arrivals and depar-
tures among others. The tool is available on a public website13 with predefined data but can be
used with specific ProGres databases.
Where it is used
ProGres is aimed to be used globally. In Europe it is used in Belarus14 and in Greece within the
Greece Cash Alliance (GCA)15 to manage the provision of cash assistance to refugees and asylum-
seekers in the country. To implement the GCA, proGres v4 is integrated with the UNHCR corpo-
rate cash assistance management system CashAssist. During September 2018, 54,545 refugees
received cash assistance through the GCA16.
2.4 The Rapid Application (RApp)
Description
RApp is an application for mobile devices and laptops that allows for the quick input of iden-
tity related data in off-line modus that can be later synchronised with the proGres v4 and BIMS
11http://www.unhcr.org/registration-guidance/chapter2/define-the-data-set/
12The UNHCR Demographic Projection Tool: estimating the future size and composition of forcibly displaced popu-
lations. http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5ae9ee747/unhcr-demographic-projection-
tool-estimating-future-size-composition-forcibly.html
13http://demographicprojection.unhcr.org/
14http://www.unhcr.org/blogs/progres-version-4-is-now-live-in-belarus/
15The Greece Cash Alliance http://www.unhcr.org/5a14306a7.pdf and GREECE FACTSHEET January 2017
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/54221
16https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/66253
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databases. It allows data collection at individual and household level, including biometric data
and connection of individuals with other registered groups.
Interaction with other systems
RApp synchronises registration and identity data with proGres v4 and BIMS17.
Where it is used
It will be rolled out as part of the ongoing PRIMES deployment, particularly in East and Horn of
Africa, Middle East and North Africa and francophone Africa. It was first tested in South Africa
in March 2018 and it is been tested with Venezuelan refugees in Brazil18.
Figure 4: Registration team working on the field with the Rapp client, PRIMES offline com-
ponent (Copyright UNHCR/Omotola Akindipe, source http://www.unhcr.org/blogs/
unhcr-renew-its-registration-and-identity-management-tools-in-angola/)
2.5 Data Port
Description
The Data Port is a system used for reporting and data analysis of proGres v4 data. It will become
the repository of curated statistics and data generated by the various applications and elements
of the PRIMES ecosystem. The new platform will be designed to serve all stakeholders, including
providing data and analysis about PoC19.
17http://www.unhcr.org/blogs/wp-content/uploads/sites/48/2018/05/RApp-FactSheet.pdf
18http://www.unhcr.org/blogs/countdown-accelerated-primes-roll-starting-may/
19http://www.unhcr.org/blogs/wp-content/uploads/sites/48/2018/05/Dataport_factsheet-v1.
pdf
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Interaction with other systems
Data Port mainly works with proGres v4, but also works with the GDT, proGres v3, RAIS and other
UNHCR population data management systems.
Where it is used
It is potentially used in any project managed with any of the tools of the PRIMES ecosystem.
2.6 Biometrics Identity Management System (BIMS)
Description
BIMS is UNHCR’s principle biometric identity management system that is used globally20. Ini-
tially released in 2015, the system is built with Accenture’s UISP (Unique Identity Service Plat-
form)21. It uses all ten fingerprints and two irises from each individual to build a globally avail-
able biometric record that avoids multiple registration and data loss.
Interaction with other systems
BIMS interacts with proGres v4, RApp and the GDT.
Where it is used
BIMS is used in more than 40 countries worldwide. Since 2010 the UNHCR established the routine
use of biometric data of refugee’s identity management. In 2013 the BIMS system was first tested
in Malawi22.
2.7 IrisGuard
Description
IrisGuard23 is the other primary biometric tool collecting two iris scans and a facial photo from
each individual. It was initially applied to administering cash assistance for refugees. It intro-
duced a technical framework, EyeCloud, that ‘permits humanitarian partners and financial service
providers to validate identity and qualification for assistance via their irises.’24.
Interaction with other systems
The UNHCR Jordan, IrisGuard and Cairo Amman Bank (CAB) started the EyeCloud project to
provide financial assistance to refugees by relying exclusively on UNHCR biometric registration
data through IrisGuard25. Within this system, the refugees no longer need to go to the bank to
register and do not need ATM cards to use the CAB’s ATM network26. The iris-enabled ATMs
program started in 2012. Registration in the system is mandatory to obtain financial aid.
20http://www.unhcr.org/550c304c9.pdf
21https://www.accenture.com/us-en/success-unhcr-innovative-identity-management-system
22http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/550c304c9/biometric-identity-management-
system.html
23http://www.irisguard.com/
24http://www.unhcr.org/registration-guidance/chapter2/registration-tools/
25http://www.cab.jo/news/unhcr-cairo-amman-bank-and-irisguard-unveil-ground-breaking-
technology-enhance-delivery-refugee
26http://www.irisguard.com/index.php/video/index/34
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Figure 5: ATM with IrisGuard autentication (Source http://www.irisguard.com/index.
php/news/index/2015/80).
Figure 6: EyePay device (Source http://www.irisguard.com/index.php/imagers).
IrisGuard is progressively integrated into more systems in an ethereum blockchain payment
platform. The blockchain platform connects monetary NGOs resources to refugees for the acqui-
sition of food in supermarkets and non-food items in camps27. Figures 5 and 6 shows the EyePay
system that is currently used with refugees.
Where it is used
It was initially introduced to support the Syrian response in Jordan and later expanded through-
out the Middle East sub-region.
2.8 Refugee Assistance Information System (RAIS)
Description
RAIS is a web management for tracking of assistance, coordination, and enhanced accountabil-
ity. It ‘supports many different procedures including vulnerability assessments, assessment management
27https://www.biometricupdate.com/201707/un-using-irisguard-ethereum-blockchain-
payment-platform-for-refugees
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and coordination, cash distribution, referrals and ticketing, offline functionalities and interoperability with
applications of other agencies’28.
Interaction with other systems
RAIS is synchronized daily with proGres: ‘RAIS enables partners to search for cases and individuals
registered with UNHCR. Partners, having signed the UNHCR data sharing agreement, can receive access
in order to be able to view basic bio data of registered persons of concern, their address and documents, in
addition to data on eligibility and assistance delivered by other implementing partners.’29.
Where it is used
RAIS was initially developed in the UNHCR section in Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
and it is mainly used in that region.
2.9 The Global Distribution Tool (GDT)
Description
The GDT was launched with BIMS to allow the use biometrics to verify identities in food and
assistance distribution scenarios. ‘The GDT accepts food distribution lists or manifests from a variety of
sources including proGres,and provides real-time reporting on exactly who has collected assistance by using
a biometric verification with BIMS’. The tool facilitates alternative food collectors for the households.
The GDT ‘Reports also provide detail on which households have been served, and the specifics of
exactly which commodities have been distributed.’. The GDT includes an Android App to help
the staff to track admission, and successfully record collection of assistance.30.
Interaction with other systems
The GDT gets food distribution lists and manifests from proGres, but also from other sources. It
interacts with BIMS to authenticate users.
Where it is used
In 2017 the UNHCR reported the GDT has been used with BIMS in three country operations
(Burundi, Djibouti and Kenya) to distribute assistance by the World Food Programme.Use and
relevance of PRIMES for Europe
In 2017 the UNHCR reported the GDT has been used with BIMS in three country operations
(Burundi, Djibouti and Kenya) to distribute assistance by the World Food Programme31.Use and
relevance of PRIMES for Europe. In 2017 the UNHCR reported the GDT has been used with BIMS
in three country operations (Burundi, Djibouti and Kenya) to distribute assistance by the World
Food Programme.Use and relevance of PRIMES for Europe.
PRIMES is very relevant for the EU. First, the proPres database is used for refugee’s resettle-
ment in Europe32 and for auditing the EU aiding programs. Second, some of the PRIMES tools
are directly used in Europe to register refugees. The proGres version 4 is now live in the following
European countries:
28http://unhcr-mena.github.io/RAIS/
29http://www.coordinationtoolkit.org/wp-content/uploads/UNHCR-Managing-Information-in-
the-Inter-Agency-Context1.pdf
30https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.unhcr.gdt4
312017. Global Strategic Priorities. Progress Report available at http://www.unhcr.org/5b2b75e37.pdf.
32https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCRTurkeyResettlementUpdate-
July2017.pdf and http://www.unhcr.org/56fa35b16.pdf.
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• Greece: it is used to register refugees and to provide cash assistance3334 (see Figure 7) in
coordination with partners35. Refugees use a card and PIN to withdraw cash from cash
points or to pay for goods and services in shops. Attempts of using cards outside Greece
causes the card to be automatically blocked.
• Serbia36: it is used by the UNHCR and partners.
• Belarus37: it is used by the NGO ‘Refugee Counselling Service’, which is a partner of the
UNHCR.
Figure 7: Greece Cash Alliance scheme overview (Source The Greece Cash Alliance).
2.10 The ID2020 project
The ID2020 project38 aims at providing a global ID for the worldwide population (Cheesman,
2016), with special emphasis on refugees, developing countries and conflict zones. The UN con-
siders identification systems a person’s right that contributes to the guarantee of Human Rights.
The project is presented as a strategic step to build on the framework of the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals of the UN. The alliance includes UN agencies such as UNCHR, NGOs, governments,
and enterprises such as Accenture and Microsoft. The ID2020 project requires digital identity
‘to meet the needs of governments, international organizations, businesses and individuals alike’, more
precisely, it must satisfy the following features39:
• Personal: unique to you and only you
• Persistent: lives with you from life to death
• Portable: accessible anywhere you happen to be
• Private: only you can give permission to use or view data
They project website provide examples of limitations that refugees may face without a proper
ID40:
33UNHCR’s Cash Assistance Management System in Greece http://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/
5a6600e57/cashassist-unhcrs-cash-assistance-management-system-greece.html
34http://donors.unhcr.gr/echo/en/cash_card_restores_dignity/
35The Greece Cash Alliance https://www.unhcr.org/5a14306a7.pdf
36European Refugee Situation in Serbia: Main developments and UNHCR response in numbers during the first
half of 2017 https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/58649 and https://data2.unhcr.org/
en/documents/download/65008
37http://www.unhcr.org/blogs/progres-version-4-is-now-live-in-belarus/
38https://id2020.org/ and https://medium.com/@id2020
39https://id2020.org/partnership/
40https://medium.com/id2020/the-implications-of-mandatory-sim-registration-for-
refugees-stateless-and-forcibly-displaced-9b0d47e9eaff
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[...]
In Bangladesh, for example, the government has recently banned mobile phone op-
erators from selling SIM cards to Rohingya refugees fleeing the violence in Myanmar,
citing security concerns. The policy indicates that the form of identification held by the
Rohingya is insufficient to meet valid identification requirements. The government is
conducting a 6-month biometric registration process of the refugees, after which the
ban could potentially be lifted.
[...]
While a number of countries currently recognize UNHCR-issued identification as ac-
ceptable proof-of-identity for SIM registration or KYC requirements (including Jordan,
Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Rwanda, Pakistan, the Philippines and Haiti), GSMA41 ad-
vocates for broader recognition of the UNHCR-issued identification in order to enable
refugees upon arrival to access mobile SIMs, wallets, SIM-based energy products, and
more.
This conversation around SIM registration is emblematic of a larger conversation:
how do we ensure that refugees and other forcibly displaced populations are able
to portably, persistently and privately prove who they are?
Problems of previous (failed) attempts are identified as being related to ‘market failure’, which
ID2020 will avoid with added value by ‘Creating a market for such digital identity systems, ultimately
resulting in increased private-sector attention, support, and contributions’ among other values.
In addition, Accenture, one of the partners of the ID2020 alliance, is testing the global ID
system with their global workforce42:
Accenture, as a founding partner of the Alliance, is considering rolling out an interop-
erable, user-owned and controlled digital identity to their workforce, which numbers
many hundreds of thousands of people worldwide. This would provide Accenture
employees the benefits of digital identity, cut down on the high costs paid by the firm
for background checks on Accenture employees sent to a new client site, and build
momentum for digital identity to be recognized by a broadening sphere of actors.
2.11 Controversy and cautions about ID and biometric databases
Concerns have been raised about the potential dangers of global ID databases and biometrical
databases such as the biometric identity management system (BIMS) of UNCHR43. An article
in Wire exposes the specific negative implications of refugees database in the case of Rohingya
refugees (Thomas, 2018). Also, an internal audit of the UN in 2016 questioned ‘The ability of
refugees in desperate need of aid to refuse consent for their biometric data to be collected’ drawing on
cases from India, Thailand and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Thomas, 2018).
Because of the inherent risk of biometric databased, UNICEF has stopped collecting biometric
data in their LMMS44 system and have opened an internal debate and a review on the implications
of biometric databases (Kondakhchyan, 2017). Further concerns have been raised about the possi-
ble vulnerability of biometric authentication systems. Last year the Samsung Galaxy Iris Scanner
was hacked in the CCC conference45. This is not the same system used in BIMS, however the
study pointed out the security problems that any system can potentially face. Previously in 2013,
41https://www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/mandatory-registration-prepaid-sim-cards
42https://id2020.org/partnership/
43http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/basic/550c304c9/biometric-identity-management-
system.html
44Last Mile Mobile Solutions (LMMS) https://www.wvi.org/disaster-management/last-mile-mobile-
solution-lmms
45Hacking the Samsung Galaxy S8 Iris scanner, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtQ4yzbsi-c
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CCC broke the Apple Touch ID based on fingerprint46 and more recently researchers were able
to generate synthetic fingerprints that can fortuitously match with a large number of fingerprints
thereby undermining the security afforded by fingerprint systems (Bontrager et al., 2017).
Finally, the UNHCR published report on Privacy Impact Assessment of their Cash Based In-
terventions (CBI) (Consulting, 2015). The report presents a risks and threats evaluation as well as
a set of recommendations to meet PoC data protection obligations and minimise the risk to their
fundamental right to privacy. The main key findings were grouped by:
• Privacy risks related to PoC lack of real choice to register in the systems, use of the data for
other purposes other than that for which it was collected, the risk of collecting more sen-
sitive data for the most vulnerable refugees, the need of minimising the access to person-
ally identifiable information (PII), the problem of data retention and deletion for auditing
that amplifies the privacy risks, the collection and sharing of data across CBIs which has
resulting in the creation of multiple databases containing PII within UNHCR and partner
organisations among others risks.
• Threat and vulnerability, which groups cyber espionage by governments and non-state ac-
tors, physical loss of data because of multiple external devices with refugee data, technical
failures due to infrequent back-ups and inadequate protections, unauthorised acquisition by
Governments from UNHCR or partners, lack of procedures to check partner abuse of PII,
partner negligence (for instance the bank passes data to third party provider) and refugee
complains and litigation (according to the report ‘refugees are unhappy with how their data is
collected, used or transferred; refugees are unhappy at their treatment at the hands of a UNHCR
partner (e.g., a bank or supermarket)’).
3 Refugees registration and border control in the EU
3.1 Tools in use in the EU
3.1.1 Eurodac
Since 2003 the European Union has implemented the identification of asylum applicants through
Eurodac47. Eurodac is an EU refugee fingerprint database, ‘Automated Fingerprint Identification
System’ (AFIS), that centralises all the fingerprints of persons applying for asylum. When some-
one applies for asylum, no matter where they are in the EU, their fingerprints are transmitted
to the Eurodac central system. The Eurodac was initially designed to meet the Regulation (EU)
No. 604/20133 (a.k.a. ‘Dublin Regulation’), which holds that refugees have to apply for protec-
tion in the first country of the EU they have entered. The regulation also aims to avoid multiple
asylum seeker applications in different countries.
According to studies, in 2014 it held personal information of nearly 2.3 million individuals
(Jones, 2014), and in 2015-2017 4.5 million of people were added48. Figure 8 shows the evolution
of the number of transactions.
Apart from implementing the Dublin Regulation, the database also provides statistics on
refugees for policy-making49. However, Eurodac was integrated later into the Europol databases
so that the asylum fingerprints are contrasted with criminal records. The ongoing proposal on
May 2016 of functionality extension ‘Introduces the obligation to take fingerprints and an additional
biometric identifier – a facial image – and it lowers the age of taking fingerprints to 6 years old;‘. It also
’Allows to store and compare all three categories of data and to retain fingerprint data for illegally staying
46Chaos Computer Club breaks Apple TouchID, https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2013/ccc-breaks-
apple-touchid
47https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/identification-of-
applicants_en
48https://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/2017%20Eurodac%20Annual%20Report%
20-%20Factsheet.pdf
49https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/statistics_en
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Figure 8: Evolution of procesed transactions by Eurodac (Source (eu LISA, 2018)).
third-country nationals or third –country nationals who have crossed an external border irregularly and
who do not claim asylum for 5 years.’50.
Eurodac, and more specifically the repurposing of its uses, has raised several claims that the
system is violating Human Rights. Ferraris (2017) reports that member states’ categorization of
migrants is arbitrary, since the number of registers in each category suggest that different coun-
tries have different policies (see Figures 9 and 10).
Moreover, the German Institute for Human Rights (DIMR) has criticized Eurodac, identifying
several concerns (Dernbach, 2015a,b):
• Information on asylum seekers remains in the database for 10 years.
• ‘Eurodac was originally intended to prevent multiple asylum applications and unauthorised entry’,
however, access was extended to further authorities including Europol among others.
• The way refugees are recorded assimilated them with criminals: ‘Storage in a database acces-
sible to the police means they are treated like offenders or potential suspects’.
• The collection of data can be problematic from a HR perspective, since persons refusing to
have their fingerprints taken can be forced to do so.
Also, The Migrant Files51 project reported that ‘at least ten people a year are wrongly deported due
to false system hits in the fingerprint ID scanning devices. The true number may be far higher.’.
An extensive research report on Eurodac design and practices has also been done by the
Mig@Net52 research project on digital networks, migrants and gender. Through several inter-
views with practitioners, the authors ‘break definitively with the idea that control technologies – in our
case biometric identification technologies – are primarily technological’ (Vassilis and Kuster, 2012). As
an illustrative example, they report that the system automatically plays the James Bond melody
when a positive hit is found. Similarly to the critique advanced by DIMR, Vassilis and Kuster
(2012) confirm the arbitrary use of categories in Eurodac: ‘During our visit, we noticed that very of-
ten police officers would lack training and frequently they would still after eight years of experience ignore
the meaning and difference of categories 1, 2, and 3.’.
50https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/
european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160504/
eurodac_proposal_en.pdf
51http://www.themigrantsfiles.com/
52http://www.mignetproject.eu
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Figure 9: Number of EURODAC transactions for each category and country (Source (Lyneham,
2017)).
Figure 10: Number of transactions of Eurodac for each category and year (Source (eu LISA, 2018)).
3.1.2 AVATAR
AVATAR stands for Automated Virtual Agent Truth Assessment in Real Time53. AVATAR is being
used experimentally in the Romanian Border since 201454. There is as yet not information about
the conclusions of these experiments.
In an extensive report (F. Nunamaker et al., 2013) the University of Arizona, who developed
AVATAR before it was commercialised by EyeTech DS, provides a summary of the tool:
The National Center for Border Security and Immigration (BORDERS) has developed
the Automated Virtual Agent for Truth-Assessment in Real-Time (AVATAR), a kiosk-
like system designed to automatically and independently conduct natural credibility
53https://www.eyetechds.com/avatar-lie-detector.html
54https://btn.frontex.europa.eu/category/free-text-descriptors/avatar and https:
//btn.frontex.europa.eu/node/1792
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Figure 11: AVATAR virtual agent lie detector (Source EyeTech).
assessment interviews. AVATAR uses a virtual conversational agent to conduct inter-
views while simultaneously detecting potential anomalous behavior via analysis of
data streams from noninvasive sensors such as cameras, microphones, and eye track-
ing systems. Potential indicators of deception are compared to an individual baseline
- individuals are not flagged for simply being nervous about the interview. To ensure
privacy, all data has been kept anonymous and only aggregate data is reported.
AVATAR collects information about interviewed persons to improve future accuracy of the
system55.
3.1.3 Smart deception detection by iBorderCtrl
The European Research project iBorderCtrl56 has produced an Automated Deception Detection
System (ADDS) intended to be used in border crossings. The prototype will be trialled in Hun-
gary, Greece and Latvia. The EU-funded project ‘is developing a way to speed up traffic at the EU’s
external borders and ramp up security using an automated border-control system that will put travellers
to the test using lie-detecting avatars. It is introducing advanced analytics and risk-based management at
border controls.’57.
The ADDS is implemented using Silent Talker58, an artificial intelligence based deception de-
tector (Rothwell et al., 2006) and a virtual agent asking questions about a migrant’s background
and intentions. The iBorderCtrl team created a training dataset of 32 people simulating border
55https://techlaunch.arizona.edu/news/university-arizona-licenses-deception-detecting-
avatar-startup
56https://www.iborderctrl.eu/
57http://ec.europa.eu/research/infocentre/article_en.cfm?artid=49726
58https://www.silent-talker.com/
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interviews and scenarios of truthful and deceptive situations. The situations consisted of different
question/answer tests and a vector of 38 channels (features) was extracted to describe the non-
verbal behaviour during a one second slot during each answer. The resulting data set was used
to train an artificial neural network to label each person answer with low, medium and high risk
of deception.
The announce of the ongoing tests of the ADDS in the EU has caused a public discussion in
the media. The Guardian collected the opinion of several experts criticising the system as ‘pseudo-
science’ by experts in forensic phycology and criminology who questioned the validity of facial
micro-expressions as a measure of deception (Boffey, 2018). Also, the New Scientist reported that
’several independent experts contacted by New Scientist expressed strong reservations about the idea, ques-
tioning the accuracy of automated lie-detection systems in general’ (Heaven, 2018).
For this report we examined the scientific papers describing Silent Talker (Rothwell et al., 2006)
and the ADDS (OrShea et al., 2018). Apart from the claims of the experts in physiology and crim-
inology, we found several concerns regarding the experimental setup and quality of the machine
learning models. First, the general setup of the experiments is questionable. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to design an experiment to evaluate deception behaviour. In this case, the authors of
ADDS asked some colleagues to perform different roles and scenarios. Their non-verbal activity
was recorded to build a training dataset based exclusively on people performing a role. Second,
the authors of the study claim that their system is sensitive to ethnic diversity, however the sys-
tem has been trained with the micro-expressions of 32 persons. Third, the experimental validation
consisted of a 10-fold cross validation with a mean accuracy of 75.5% for truthful detection and
73.6% for deception detection. This is the mean performance of ten runs for different train-test
data folds. However, variability of the prediction accuracy is not considered in the report. From
the tables in the paper, we can calculate the standard error (24.3% and 34.3% for truthful and de-
ception respectively) that suggest that the mean performance is not a robust statistical estimator
of the actual performance. Last, the stratification of the data split for train and test is problematic.
The experimental validation divides the data in train and test sets to assert the performance con-
sidering all the vectors extracted from all the participants. This means that the data of a person
will be present both in the training and testing sets. Therefore, the data used for model fitting is
also used for model validation.
3.2 Research projects on smart borders and migration management
The Migrant Files59 documents European research and industry projects related to border, mi-
grant and refugee management up to 2016. In addition, Border TechNet (https://btn.frontex.
europa.eu/) is a web-based platform for sharing, exchanging and disseminating information in
the field of Research and Development in the border-security domain. The following recent and
ongoing projects are related to migration management:
• Scalable Measures for Automated Recognition Technologies (SMART): Scalable Measures for Au-
tomated Recognition Technologies (SMART) project aim is to evaluate the risk and opportunities
inherent to the use of smart surveillance, develop number of technical, procedural and legal options
for safeguards60.
• SMILE proposes a novel mobility concept, using privacy by design principles, that will enable low
cost secure exchange and processing of biometric data, addressing in parallel the aforementioned
challenges by designing, implementing and evaluating in relevant environments (TRL6) prototype
management architecture, for the accurate verification, automated control, monitoring and optimiza-
tion of people’ flows at Land Border Infrastructures61.
• The goal of the PROTECT project is an enhanced biometric-based person identification system that
works robustly across a range of border crossing types and that has strong user-centric features.
59http://www.themigrantsfiles.com/
60https://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/178069_en.html
61http://smile-h2020.eu/smile/blog/
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The system will be deployed in Automated Border Control (ABC) areas supporting border guards
to facilitate smooth and non-intrusive rapid crossing by travellers based on deployment of the next
generation of biometric identification detection methods62.
• Prediction and Interpretation of human behaviour based on probabilistic structures and heteroge-
neous sensors (PROMETHEUS) project intends to establish a link between fundamental sensing
tasks and automated cognition processes that concern the understanding of short-term prediction of
human behaviour as well as complex human interaction. The analysis of human behaviour in unre-
stricted environments, including localization and tracking of multiple people and recognition of their
activities, currently constitutes a topic of intensive research in the signal processing and computer vi-
sion communities. This research is driven by different important applications, including unattended
surveillance and intelligent space monitoring.
• SURVEILLE. Surveillance: Ethical Issues, Legal Limitations, Efficiency (SURVEILLE) project aim
is to analyze the ethical issues, legal limitations and efficiency of the use of surveillance technologies63.
• IborderCtrl (Intelligent Portable Control System) is an innovative project that aims to enable faster
and thorough border control for third country nationals crossing the land borders of EU Member
States (MS), with technologies that adopt the future development of the Schengen Border Manage-
ment. iBorderCtrl includes software and hardware technologies ranging from portable readers and
scanners, various emerging and novel subsystems for automatic controls, highly reliable wireless
networking for mobile controls, and secure backend storage and processing. One of the main goals
of the project is to design and implement a comprehensive system that adopts mobility concepts and
consists of a two-stage-procedure, designed to reduce cost and time spent per traveller at the border
crossing station. iBorderCtrl also focuses on the land border crossing points: road, walkway, train
stations. It addresses the better facilitation of thorough checking required for third country nationals
that intend to cross EU borders.64.
3.3 Practices involving datafication and automated systems
3.3.1 Mobile and social networks data analysis for story verification
Several EU countries are using social network and mobile phone data analysis during the asylum
evaluation interviews. It has been reported that the UK and Norway have previously searched
asylum seekers’ devices while more recently Germany65, Denmark, Belgium and Austria are
changing laws to allow for these procedures (Meaker, 2018). These practices are also common
in the US66 and Canada67. For instance, ‘in Germany, only 40 per cent of asylum applicants in 2016
could provide official identification documents. In their absence, the nationalities of the other 60 per cent
were verified through a mixture of language analysis — using human translators and computers to confirm
whether their accent is authentic — and mobile phone data.’ (Meaker, 2018). The analysis of such data
is used to look for inconsistencies in an applicant’s story. For mobile data analysis, authorities are
using a computer programme that combines technology made by two mobile forensic companies
(T3K and MSAB). Mobile forensic programs obtain all type of data from devices such as contacts,
SMS, instant messaging text and media, location records, browsing history, etc. These tools can
access device information that a normal user cannot access to, even if this information has been
deleted.
Apart from country or area of origin verification, other situations related to the asylum status
are verified. Admission and exclusion of asylum seekers who have fled persecution based on
62http://projectprotect.eu/
63https://btn.frontex.europa.eu/projects/external/surveille
64https://www.iborderctrl.eu/
65https://www.theverge.com/2017/3/3/14803852/germany-refugee-phone-data-law-privacy
66https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/us-visitors-may-have-hand-over-social-media-
passwords-kelly-n718216
67https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/syrian-refugee-screening-will-be-a-
challenge-but-one-canada-can-meet-1.3321889
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their sexual orientation or gender identity is a concern in borders and interview evaluation. For
instance, the UK is performing extensive interviews for LGTBI+ condition verification (Shephard,
2018). The media (Hall, 2013) and researchers (Lewis, 2014) have reported numerous cases of
gay couples forced to provide photo and video evidences of their sexual activities to validate
their sexuality. The UK Lesbian & Gay Immigration Group reported that only 1-2% queer asylum
cases passed the initial interview stage, compared to 27% of other asylum claims (Yoshida, 2013).
Other ‘hostile’ policies have been studied on relationships between British and non-EU part-
ners and families. Agusita (2018) studied issues of relation evidence by Non-European-Economic-
Area migrants applying to join their British partners, ‘this includes communications data sourced from
multiple platforms and technologies, such as calling and messaging records.’.
3.3.2 Minimisation of human interaction and automated interviews
Some countries are moving to automated or semi-automated systems to manage migrants and
refugees’ evaluation at the borders or camps (including the AVATAR system mentioned above).
In 2016, Greece implemented asylum evaluation interviews through a Skype line to replace
asylum officials and official paperwork in the camps, often requiring repeated calls to get through
(Kyrke-Smith, 2016).
The Netherlands is using an automated system for Dutch language skills evaluation of mi-
grants. The tool was created by Pearson Education with fairness design criteria68. For instance,
the scoring system was created combining speech of non-native Dutch speakers from 121 coun-
tries and Dutch native speakers.
Also related to language analysis, many countries are using language analysis for the determi-
nation of origin (LADO) as an instrument to determine the national or ethnic origin of the asylum
seeker, through an evaluation of their language profile (Patrick et al., 2019). The rationale of
the use of LADO is to assess the origin of the person in absence of documentation. Examples are
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Reath, 2004). The LADO performed by humans
has been criticised by immigration lawyers, social scientists, as well as linguists (Eades et al.,
2003). For example, even in the case of a perfect LADO evaluation, linguists warn about the issue
of ‘first language attrition’, meaning the process of forgetting a native language in immigrants
and bilinguals69. However, Germany has turned to the use of automatic speech analysis software
to verify refugees’ dialects, and consequently establish their origin in absence of identification or
documents70.
4 Humanitarian data collection and analysis
Migration statistics are essential to migration management but is a complex area of study with
many difficulties due to the inherent nature of the problem. Traditional migration statistics gather
information from censuses, population registers, surveys, several administrative sources and bor-
der statistics. Although these data are generally corrected with synthetic estimates and using
multiple sources, it can still error prone whilst it is very costly to obtain compared to other data
sources. Under these assumptions, a large set of proposals are addressing migration analysis and
management based on Big Data, i.e. using mobile phone and social network data as information
source (Hughes et al., 2016; Cheesman, 2017; De Backer, 2014). This includes call detail records,
dairy mobile additional information (location, sensors data...) but also all kind of digital infor-
mation including social network data, geotagged media data, web searches, etc. (Gilespie et al.,
2016)
68http://www.versanttest.com/solutions/Case%20Study%20-%20Dutch%20Immigration%20-
%20CINOP.pdf
69https://languageattrition.org/
70https://www.dw.com/en/automatic-speech-analysis-software-used-to-verify-refugees-
dialects/a-37980819
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4.1 Governments and agencies
The report for the European Commission by Hughes et al. (2016) presents a review of research
work using Big Data to track migrants in the EU context. It mainly focusses on solutions to im-
prove demographic inference and movement of migrant populations rather than tracking specific
persons. Also, the UN is actively promoting Big Data for use thorough the United Nations Global
Pulse71 and its open data and statistics web site72. The Office of Information and Communications
Technology (OICT) of the UN is actively promoting data-driven decision-making73, including,
for instance, specific response design for climate conditions and movement of refugees74 or host
communities’ sentiment toward people of concern (UN Global Pulse, UNHCR Innovation Ser-
vice 2017). Other projects such as the UN program UNOSAT perform satellite based mapping of
specific events related to forced displacements75. The World Economic Forum is also encouraging
the use of Big Data to help migrants (Rango, 2015). Finally, the World Bank and the UNHCR have
created the Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement that will be launched late 201876. These
actors previously collaborated in other data analytic projects, for instance, in a joint study on the
welfare of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. In this study, they used survey and registry
data on Syrian refugees ‘to assess their poverty and vulnerability status, understand the predictors of
these statuses, evaluate the performance of existing policies toward refugees, and determine the potential
for alternative policies’ (Verme, Paolo et al., 2016).
4.2 Academia and civil society
Several projects aim at contributing to refugee welfare though data analysis and technology based
proposals. Examples are historical data visualization (see The Refugee Project77 or Earth Time78),
patterns of mobility (see Data-Pop Alliance79), tracking of migrant fatalities80, knowledge shar-
ing81, humanitarian information tools82 and apps specifically designed for refugees83.
Also, data science competitions have been launched to help refugees, for instance the D4R
Challenge84 in Turkey (Salah et al., 2018):
The Data for Refugees (D4R) Challenge is a non-profit challenge initiated to improve
the conditions of the Syrian refugees in Turkey by providing a special database to
scientific community for enabling research on urgent problems concerning refugees,
including health, education, unemployment, safety, and social integration. The col-
lected database is based on anonymised mobile Call Detail Record (CDR) of phone
calls and SMS messages from one million Turk Telekom customers. It indicates broad
activity and mobility patterns of refugees and citizens in Turkey for one year. The data
collection period is from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2017. The project is initiated
by Turk Telekom, in partnership with the Turkish Academic and Research Council
(TUBITAK) and Bogazici University, and in collaboration with several academic and
71https://www.unglobalpulse.org/programme-type/humanitarian-action
72http://www.unhcr.org/data.html
73https://unite.un.org/analytics
74http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2016/1/56a20b3c6/big-chill-threatens-refugees-
unhcrs-winter-cell-responds.html
75http://www.unitar.org/unosat/
76https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/forceddisplacement/brief/unhcr-world-bank-
group-joint-data-center-on-forced-displacement-fact-sheet and http://blogs.worldbank.
org/dev4peace/new-data-center-improve-global-response-forced-displacement
77http://www.therefugeeproject.org
78https://earthtime.org/stories/global_refugee_crisis_a_system_overburdened
79http://datapopalliance.org/research/migration-and-displacement/
80https://missingmigrants.iom.int/
81http://www.qzenobia.com/
82https://labs.reliefweb.int/
83http://appsforrefugees.com and http://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/2287/a-list-of-apps-
for-refugees
84http://d4r.turktelekom.com.tr/
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non-governmental organizations, including UNHCR Turkey, UNICEF, and Interna-
tional Organization for Migration.
Other institutions have released public datasets to encourage academia and civil society to
gain insights from data. In Kaggle85, a data science competitions web site, the UNHCR released
the data on uprooted populations and asylum processing86, the US Department of Homeland
Security launched data to study which countries do most people granted refugee or asylum status
come from87 and Medicins Sains Frontieres created a competition on predicting the number of
refugees entering Europe to proactively prepare assistance88.
Further academic work has explored different types of data-driven solutions related to mi-
gration and refugees. For instance, the role of crowd-generated data is studied by (Curry et al.,
2018). Also this year, the Imigration Policy Lab89 developed a proposal to use Big Data to improve
refugee resettlement (Bansak et al., 2018).
5 List of EU vendors for borders and migration/refugees man-
agement technology
This section lists some of the companies providing technology and products to manage borders
and migration/refugees camps.
5.1 Securiport LLC
Securiport LLC90 is an US based company that provides the following products:
• Biometric Identification Systems, including Multi-Modal Biometric Recognition (fingerprint,
iris, and face recognition analyses).
• Automated Immigration Gates91.
• Persons of Interest profiles matching using Big Data analytics92, including the detection of
potential terrorists that might be hidden in refugees moves93. This includes information
fusion of international watch lists, Interpol databases, local security databases, advanced
biometrics, identity controls and predictive analytics.
5.2 Crossmatch
Crossmatch94 is a vendor of a fingerprint based identity system that is used in several contexts.
The following are related to migration management:
• Border management though a biometric identity system that can interoperate with border
agencies and INTERPOL95.
85https://www.kaggle.com/
86https://www.kaggle.com/unitednations/refugee-data
87https://www.kaggle.com/dhs/refugee-report/home
88https://www.kaggle.com/c/refugee-migration-data624-16b
89https://immigrationlab.org/project/harnessing-big-data-to-improve-refugee-
resettlement/
90https://securiport.com/
91https://securiport.com/technology/automated-immigration-gates/
92https://securiport.com/solutions/persons-of-interest/
93https://securiport.com/impetus-changing-border-security-paradigms-stem-trans-
regional-migration-crisis-global-open-border-terrorism-innovative-integrated-approach/ s
94https://www.crossmatch.com/
95https://www.crossmatch.com/biometric-identity-solutions/civil-government/border-
management/
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• Manage migrant identities, secure migrant camps and streamline delivery of humanitarian
assistance through the use of biometrics96.
5.3 Accenture
Accenture97 is a global management consulting and professional services company, including for
identity management:
• Accenture has developed the UNHCR biometric identity system (BIMS)98.
• Accenture and Microsoft are leading the ID2020 Alliance99.
5.4 Microsoft
Microsoft is a long-term partner of the UNHCR involved in several IT services:
• Microsoft is a partner in the ID2020 Alliance.
• Some PRIMES components are implemented using Microsoft Dynamics CRM.
• The UN is using Office 365 for electronic communications100.
• The company is involved in refugees digital education101.
5.5 Unisys
Unisys is an international company working in many domains. Their product LineSightTM is used
in many borders in EU, as well as other countries such as Australia, as a border security tool102. It
aggregates information from several sources to perform intelligence analysis for automated risk
assessments for travellers, vessels, parcels or cargo shipments.
In a blog post in 2016 the company proposes the use of their solutions for law enforcement and
border security to address asylum seekers management including risk analysis ‘to face risks from
terrorism and organized crime, as well as to community cohesion’, biometric and mobile identification,
case management and data analytics (including predictive analytics) 103.
5.6 Vision-box
Vision-box is a provider of automated border control systems and electronic identify solutions.
Their products include electronic gates based on facial recognition and virtual agents to fully
automate border crossings104. Their products include electronic gates based on facial recognition
and virtual agents to fully automate border crossings.
96https://www.crossmatch.com/biometric-identity-solutions/civil-government/migrant/ and
http://info.crossmatch.com/hubfs/brochure/migrant-refugee-identity-management.pdf
97https://www.accenture.com/
98https://www.accenture.com/us-en/success-unhcr-innovative-identity-management-system
99https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-blockchain-ID2020
100https://unite.un.org/
101https://www.unrefugees.org/news/unhcr-announces-a-partnership-with-microsoft-
supporting-connected-education-opportunities-for-refugees/
102https://www.unisys.com/offerings/industry-solutions/public-sector-industry-solutions/
justice-law-enforcement-and-border-security-solutions/linesight
103The European Refugee Crisis: A Way Forward http://blogs.unisys.com/onpoint/the-european-
refugee-crisis-a-way-forward/
104https://www.vision-box.com/
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5.7 Herta
Herta105 is an international company based in Spain that provides facial recognition technologies
including person identification and tracking even in crowded scenarios. The company is the
vendor providing the facial recognition module in the automated border control system designed
within the iBorderCtrl project.
5.8 EyeTech DS
EyeTech DS106 is an US company that develops technology for eyes tracking. They are commer-
cializing AVATAR, which was originally developed at the University of Arizona.
5.9 European arms industry
Several European arms industries are selling technologies such as radars to reinforce border con-
trol across the European Union, but also in externalized EU borders. Moreover, these companies
are actively involved in European research projects on borders control and security. The report
‘Border Wars. The arms dealers profiting from Europe’s refugee tragedy’ (Akkerman, 2016) iden-
tifies a long list of companies implementing these technologies (Airbus, ASD, Avio, Atos, BAE
Systems, CEA, Conceptivity, CORTE, Diehl, Engineering Ingegneria Informatica, EOS, Finmecca-
nica, Fraunhofer, G4S, IBM, Indra, KEMEA, Raytheon, SAAB, Safran, Siemens, Smiths Detection,
STM, Thales, TNO, Vitec).
6 Conclusions
This report covers most of the systems in use to manage refugees by the UNHCR and the EU. It
outlines a variety of tools that are progressively being advanced for the purposes of distributed
systems integration, interoperability with partners and type and amount of data related to refugees
and migrants. Pertinently, this year the PRIMES system will be deployed on a global scale. In ad-
dition, the ID2020 project continues its development through a coalition of industry and the UN.
The EU is actively financing border control research projects based on an increased use of
biometric data, databases integration, smart border systems and predictive tools among others.
Meanwhile, Eurodac continues to grow through the collection of a variety of recorded informa-
tion and the EU plans to increase the kind of people that must be registered within the system.
Nevertheless, Eurodac functionality extensions are generating an increasing concern. Eurodac is
a perfect example of systems that have been repurposed in a way that incorporates new surveil-
lance activities. This raises concerns about the extent to which the mere creation of databases has
implications for human rights.
Finally, aid projects present new issues for persons of concerns who are forced to give sensitive
information to gain access to basic resources. This implicates humanitarian organisations and
private companies as well, that are involved in the datafication of refugee management to provide
aid and to improve their integration by means of technology.
7 Related projects, organizations, blogs
• http://www.mignetproject.eu/
• http://www.asylumineurope.org/
• http://www.statewatch.org/
105https://www.hertasecurity.com
106https://www.eyetechds.com/
22
• https://www.ecre.org/
• Border Criminologies https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-
criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog
• Mapping asylum procedures, reception conditions, detention and content of protection in
Europe https://www.asylumineurope.org/
8 Open Databases and source code
1. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/
database
2. http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/
3. http://www.unhcr.org/data.html
4. UNHCR MENA at GitHub https://github.com/unhcr-mena
5. https://github.com/unhcr
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A Datasets for registration (UNHCR)
Dataset Information Purpose
Group pre-registration
Collection of core data at the
group level
• Group size
• Age cohort/sex
breakdown
• Name of group focal
point
• Country of origin of
group focal point
• Specific needs within
the group
• Unique group
identifier
• Pre-registration date
• (optional) GPS
coordinates
• Organizing
movements of
populations
• Facilitating assistance
distribution
• Scheduling for
individual registration
• Establish the general
profile of a population
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Individual Emergency
Registration (IER)
Collection of seven core data
elements for each individual
within a group
Group information:
• Date of arrival
• Registration date
• Group unique
identifier
• Legal status
• Current CoA address
(if available)
• Phone number (if
available)
• Consent/prohibiti on
to share information
From all individuals in the
group:
• Individual names (full
name)
• Sex
• Date of birth
• Relationship to group
focal point
• Marital status
• Country of origin
• Specific needs
• Photo (strongly
recommended)
• Biometrics
(recommended)
• Issuing individual
identity documents
and entitlement
documents as
necessary
• Ascertaining
individual identity
• Identifying persons
with specific needs
• Targeting and referral
to assistance and
services
• Reliable planning and
statistics
• Use in non-emergency
contexts for a limited
time to address
backlog and other
challenges resulting in
excessive waiting
times for registration
and access to
assistance.
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Individual Basic
Registration (IBR)
Collection of basic
biographical data relating to
each individual within a
group
Individual core data
registration:
• Individual names (full
name)
• Name of father and
mother
• Sex
• Date of birth
• Country of birth
• Relationship to group
focal point
• Marital status
• Country of origin
• Citizenship(s)
• CoA address and
telephone number
(current)
• Date of arrival
• Registration date
• Specific needs
• Legal status
• (Highest) Education
level
• (Last) Occupation
• Religion
• Ethnicity
• Photograph
• Biometrics(recomm
ended)
• Consent/prohibiti on
to collect, process, use
and share information
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Individual Comprehensive
Registration (ICR)
Collection of the complete
set of biographical data on
each individual within a
group. ICR is the preferred
data set for registration
Core Data if IBR plus:
• Additional personal
names
• Place of birth
• Complete education
information
• Complete
occupation/skills
information
• Complete languages
information
• Reasons for flight (for
RSD only)
• Reasons for
unwillingness/ina
bility to return
• Complete relatives
information (spouse
and children first,
followed by other
relevant relatives)
• Complete documents
information
(Government-issue d,
UNHCR-issued,
others)
• Address details (CoA,
CoO, others as
relevant)
• Travel details (for RSD
only)
• Protection monitoring
and protection case
management,
including RSD
processing and
resettlement activities
and pre-identificatio n
for complementary
pathways (
e.g. humanitarian
admission
programmes, family
reunification and
opportunities for
skilled migration,
labor mobility and
education).
• Providing a baseline
for all protection
programming,
including prevention
of statelessness among
refugee children
(monitoring issuance
of birth certificates),
education and
livelihood
programming.
• Targeting for
assistance.
• Other individual
intervention.
Individual Enhanced
Registration (IEhR)
Depending on the context Different purposes in the
context. Individual
enhanced registration could
include additional data
relevant to targeting for
assistance, a specific
protection intervention,
birth registration, RSD
processing, resettlement,
return or local integration
30
B Protection Case Management in proGres v4 (UNHCR)
List of cases managed in proGres107:
General Protection Incidents:
• Killing (Incl. Extra-judicial, Arbitrary or Summary Execution, Including Landmine or ERW)
• Other Arbitrary Deprivation of Life
• Physical Assault or Abuse
• Torture or Inhuman, Cruel or Degrading Treatment
• Maiming or Mutilation
• Neglect ( Incl. Parental Refusal to Assume Parental Responsibility)
• Arrest and/or Detention
• Unlawful Conditions of Detention
• Abduction or Enforced Disappearance
• Recruitment Into Armed Forces / Groups
• Forced Labour or Slavery
• Asylum-seeker Denied Entry at Border/frontier
• Asylum-seeker Denied Access to Asylum Process After Entry
• Restrictions on Internal Movement
• Forced Internal Displacement
• Forced Return (IDP Only)
• Refoulement (Refugee/asylum-seeker Only)
• Denied Right of Return
• Denied Fair Trial (As the Accused and Victim)
• Denied Effective Remedy (As the Victim)
• Forced Eviction From Real Property (incl. Home, Land, Water & Pastoral Access Rights)
• Continued Occupation of Real Property
• Destruction of Real Property
• Theft, Extortion or Destruction of Personal Property (incl. Livestock)
• Denied Freedom of Thought / Conscience / Religion
• Denied Opinion / Expression / Information
• Denied Freedom of Association / Peaceful Assembly
• Denied Right to Vote or Participate in Government
• Family Separation (incl. Tracing Request)
107Protection Case Management in proGres v4_14 Dec 2015 https://prezi.com/vp7uv5vedbzv/protection-
case-management-in-progres-v4_14-dec-2015/
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• Forced Marriage (incl. Early Marriage)
• Denied Right to Marry / Found a Family
• Lack or Denial of Birth Registration and/or Certificate
• Lack or Denial of Identity Documentation (Id)
• Arbitrary Denial of Nationality
• Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality
• Lack of or Unequal Access to Food
• Lack of or Unequal Access to Water and/or Sanitation
• Lack of or Unequal Access to Shelter
• Lack of or Unequal Access to Health and HIV Services
• Lack of or Unequal Access to Education
• Humanitarians Denied Access to Civilians
• Civilian Denied Access to Humanitarian Assistance
• Injury or Death As a Result of Landmine or ERW
Sexual and Gender Based Violence:
• Rape
• Sexual Assault
• Physical Assault
• Forced Marriage
• Denial of resources, opportunities or services
• Psychological / Emotional Abuse
• Other SGBV
Protection Issues
Locally customizable for protection issues that are not incidents or human rights violations,
including Family, Administrative, Legal, Social, Security or other protection matters. Examples
might include:
• Divorce
• Lost ID documents
• Poverty
• Neglect
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